RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE POWER TO
REGULATE AND TAX INTERSTATE COMMERCE
By WALLACE MENDELSON t
Within three years of his death Harlan Fisk Stone's judicial
efforts to define the permissible extent of state encroachment upon
interstate commerce have been abandoned by the Supreme Court. The
late Chief Justice's "cumulative burden" rule for fixing the limits of
local taxation of interstate transactions has been dismissed as a mere
"fashion" in judicial utterance.1 Now with Hood v. DuMond2 his
restatement of the Cooley rule ' for determining the permissible scope
of state business regulation vis-a-vis the commerce clause seems to
have been discarded.
In the absence of relevant national action is there a residuum of
local power to govern matters of local concern which affect commerce among the several states? If there is such a residuum, what is
the judiciary's role, if any, in defining its scope? These are hardy
perennials of constitutional litigation in federal systems of government.
Chief Justice Marshall thought the commerce power was exclusively national,' though he had trouble holding that position.5 For
his successor, Chief Justice Taney, it was concurrent. The mere
grant to Congress "cannot upon any principles of construction be
construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power
over the same subject by the states." It followed that state regulations of interestate commerce were valid "unless they come into conflict with a law of Congress." 6 Under either view the courts would
have little, if any, field of operation. But when the views of the two
Chief Justices found uneasy reconciliation in the "selective exclusivity"
rule of the Cooley case and its offshoots I the Supreme Court became
umpire in the most critical area of federal relationhips.
Any doctrinal compromise of the positions of Marshall and Taney
would involve difficulties of application at best. Those difficulties
were compounded when some judges found in the compromise a temptt Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 254 (1946).
2. 336 U. S. 525 (1949).
3. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens, 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851).
4. See, for example, his language in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 185-220 (U. S.
1824) and Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446 (U. S.1827).
5. See Willson v. Blackbird Marsh Creek Co., 2 Peters 244 (U. S. 1829), discussed below.
6. The License Cases, 5 How. 504, 578 (U. S.1847).
7. As to the off-shoots see Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Hood v. DuMond, 336
U. S.525, 545 (1949).
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ing vehicle for laissez-faire. By 1927 Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting
with the concurrence of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, protested that
. . .the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus
making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference"
with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to
describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which
it is reached.'
Clearly here was an issue to be recanvassed after the judicial
"revolution" of 1937. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, fired the first
shots. He
. . . would return to the rule that-except for state acts
designed to impose discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce because it is interstate-Congress alone "must determine
how far . . . [interstate commerce]

.

. . shall be free and

untrammeled, how far it shall be burdened by duties and imposts,
and how far it shall be prohibited." '
Stone for the Court took up Black's challenge in what for a while
were leading cases in both the tax and regulatory fields.
STATE REGULATIONS AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Chief Justice Stone's response to Black's "leave-it-to-Congress"
rule where states seek to regulate national commerce came in Southern
0
Pacific Co. v. Arizona."
There an Arizona law, limiting the length
of all trains within the state, was challenged as a violation of the
dormant commerce clause. Writing for a majority, the Chief Justice
observed that "Reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power" is attainable only by "appraisal and accommodation
of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved."
In the silence of Congress, "this Court, and not the state legislature
is the final arbiter" between state and nation. That has been "accepted constitutional doctrine" for some hundred years. As arbiter
the Court must decide whether the "relative weights of the state and
national interests involved" are enough to overcome the rule that "the
free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraint
in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safe8. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 44 (1927).
9. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 455 (1939). See also
Black's opinion in Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
10. 325 U. S. 761 (1945).
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guarded" by the unexercized commerce clause. This language obviously echoes the Cooley rule, but with a new emphasis-which
Stone's careful weighing of the evidence makes clear-upon the
"facts," rather than upon "labels."
Justices Black and Douglas dissented. In their view courts should
intervene only where state legislation discriminates against interstate
commerce or is not in harmony with national legislation. Moreover,
according to Black,
This new pattern of trial procedure makes it necessary for
a judge to hear all the evidence offered as to why a legislature
passed a law and to make findings of fact as to the validity of
those reasons. If under today's ruling a court does make findings, as to a danger contrary to the findings of the legislature,
and the evidence "lends support" to those findings, a court can
then invalidate the law.

In this respect .

.

. this Court to-

day is acting, as a "super-legislature." "
The theoretical foundations of Stone's and Black's positions clearly
stemmed from different conceptions of the Court's role in our federal
system. But in practical result there was little to choose between them
in business regulatory cases. Both positions resulted in a generous
view of state power. Indeed the Southern Pacific case is the only one
in which these differences in theory led to differences in outcome. It
is also the only one prior to Hood v. DuMond in which "the Roosevelt Court" outlawed a local business regulation by virtue of the
dormant commerce clause.
But with Hood v. DuMond all that for the time recedes into history. The new fashion in regulatory cases seems to be a throw-back
to Chief Justice Marshall's position in Willson v. Blackbird Marsh
Creek Co."2 There the State of Delaware had authorized construction of a dam which completely obstructed commerce on a navigable
stream. Observing that the state's purpose was the improvement of
health and enhancement of property values, "the great Chief Justice"
(without any concessions to the principle of the non-exclusiveness of
the national commerce power) found scope for state regulations of
a "police" nature which affect, here prohibit, interstate commerceas though state regulation of commerce were one thing and state
exercise of the police power something quite different. 3 Here probably is the first use of the police power as what Mr. Justice Holmes
called "convenient apologetics."
11. Id. at 788.
12. 2 Peters 244 (U. S. 1829).
13. The hollowness of this conceptualism is analyzed by Chief justice Taney in
the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (U. S. 1847).
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In the Hood case petitioner was engaged in supplying Boston
with fluid milk procured in New York State. It operated two receiving plants in New York to which milk was delivered by the local
producers and whence it was shipped without processing to Boston.
In 1946 petitioner applied to the appropriate New York authorities
for a license to operate a third receiving plant. The license was denied
after an administrative finding that it "would tend to a destructive
competition in a market already adequately served, and would not be
in the public interest." Hood argued, inter alia, that refusal of the
license was an undue interference with national commerce.
Mr. Justice Jackson, for a five man majority, upheld Hood's position without any reference to the Cooley or Southern Pacific cases, or
the principles upon which they stood. Similarly silent as to the
Blackbird Marsh Creek case, he turns the decision upon the
. distinction betwen the power of the State to shelter
its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud,
even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and
its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such
commerce for their economic advantage . . ."'
For Justices Black and Murphy in dissent the Court had set up
"a new constitutional formula for invalidation of state law regulating
local phases of interstate commerce." Black, for all his dislike of the
Cooley-Southrn Pacific "balancing-of-interests" principle was prepared
to support it as against the new "mechanistic formula" which struck
down the New York Act "by a mere automatic application." Black's
own preference as revealed in his past opinions is for an equally
"mechanistic formula" which would "by a mere automatic application" uphold state legislation in the silence of Congress and the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce. 5 These are the
two extreme positions-reversions in effect to Marshall and Taney
(though the latter apparently would not with Black make an exception
for discrimination cases)." One reads prohibition, the other permission, in the silence of Congress. In either case the role of the
Court is greatly simplified. Black's diagnosis that the "balancingof-interests" principle makes a super-legislature of the judiciary apparently is now adopted by the Court, but his cure is rejected in
favor of a rule which puts "the inertia of government [i. e., Congress]
14. Hood v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525, 533 (1949).
15. Black apparently has abandoned the fight for this and is willing to accept the
balancing-of-interests principle. See id. at 553, note 4.
16. See FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAusE 54 (1937).
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....
on the side of freedom of commerce" " rather than upon
the side of freedom for state legislative policy as Black would have it.
When hope for obtaining a majority for the latter position had
to be abandoned Mr. Justice Douglas, who with Black and Murphy
had been its constant advocate, switched to the opposite extreme by
joining the Hood majority. That was entirely logical, if the real
objection to "balancing-of-interests" was that it made the Court a
super-legislature. Black's willingness in the Hood case to accept the
middle, or "balancing-of-interests" position, suggests greater concern
for freedom of state legislative policy than for the purity of the judicial
process. His linguistic concern for the latter in the past may have
been at least partly tactical."8 In any case Black's new position is
grounded largely upon his fear that
the new formula . . . will not merely leave a large area of

local business activities free from state regulation. All local activities that fall within the scope of this new formula will be
free from any regulatory control whatever. For it is inconceivable that Congress could pass uniform national legislation capable
of adjustment and application to all the local phases of interstate
activities that take place in the 48 states.
The judicially directed march of the due process philosophy as
an emancipator of business from regulation appeared arrested a
few years ago. That
appearance was illusory. That philosophy
continues its march. 19
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting with Rutledge, would have
remanded the case for findings that would permit judicial balancingof-interests in the manner of Stone's Southern Pacific opinion. He
could not "agree in treating what is essentially a problem of striking
a balance between competing interests as an exercise in absolutes." 20
For Frankfurter "the basic function of this Court [is to act] as mediator of powers within the federal system." 2' The late Chief Justice
doubtless would have rated that function second only to the safeguarding of civil liberty. Accordingly, neither of them could go along with
the "mechanistic" formulas of either the new Jackson or the old
Black.
17. The quotation is from Jackson's concurring opinion in Duckworth v. Arkansas,

314 U. S. 390, 400 (1941), where the Hood majority position is foreshadowed.
18. For example, Frankfurter's preoccupation with the purity of the judicial
process is well known. It is interesting that Black apparently had Frankfurter in his
camp in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176 (1940), and then lost
him.
19. Hood v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525, 545, 562 (1949).
20. Id. at 564.
21. West Va. Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 667 (1943).
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In Freeman v. Hewit Frankfurter, speaking for a majority, had
made the point that
A Police regulation of local aspects of interstate commerce
is a power often essential to a State in safeguarding vital local
interests. .

.

State taxation, falling on interstate commerce

on the other hand, can only be justified as designed to make such
commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the'local government
whose protection it enjoys. To deny to a State a particular
source of income because it taxes the very process of interstate
commerce does not imply a crippling limitation on a State's
22
ability to carry on its local function.
Accordingly, he said, the Court has always rightly "scrutinized and
resisted" state taxation more carefully than state regulation in interstate commerce cases. A majority in the Hood case now in effect
abandons that distinction and the relatively greater latitude which
it implies for state regulation as against taxation by narrowly limiting
state regulatory power to "health or safety .

.

.

and fraud" situa-

tions.
If the Hood case has meaning beyond settlement of the immediate questions there at issue, it indicates abandonment of the ninetyeight year old Cooley doctrine-hitherto an unquestioned landmark
in constitutional law. It is a switch from an ad hoc, mediatory weighing of national and local claims to "health, safety and fraud" as the
touchstone of state regulatory power affecting commerce among the
several states. The static, pristinely dictionary, sense in which Jackson uses the words "health," "safety" and "fraud" in the Hood case
indicates a much restricted area of state competence, as well as a
change in the Court's conception of its function in federalism casesfrom mediation to adjudication.
STATE TAXATION AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE

At the first opportunity after "reconstruction" of the Court in
1937 Mr. Justice Stone, for a majority, recanvassed the whole
troubled problem of the effect of the unexercised commerce power
upon state taxation. Some state tax measures had been upheld, some
had not:
The vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such
nature as to be capable, in point of substance, of being imposed
S.

or added to .

.

.

with equal right by every state which

the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being
22. 329 U. S. 249, 253 (1946).
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done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause, it
would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce
. . . [the present tax] finds support in reason, and in the practical needs of a taxing system which, under constitutional limitations, must accommodate itself to the double demand that interstate business shall pay its way, and that at the same time it shall
not be burdened with 23
cumulative exactions which are not similarly
laid on local business.
Mr. Justice Black's response to this new "cumulative burden"
rule came in a lone dissent in Gwin White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford." " There the state of Washington had imposed a "business license" tax on the gross receipts of a local firm whose business consisted in marketing Washington and Oregon fruit in several states
and foreign countries. The Court held the measure invalid:
If Washington is free to exact such a tax, other states to
which the commerce extends may, with equal right, lay a tax
similarly measured for the privilege of conducting within their
respective territorial limits the activities there which contribute
to the service. The present tax, though nominally local, thus
in its practical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it imposes upon it merely because interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden to which local
commerce is not exposed. 4
Black dissented on the ground that multiple taxation here was
purely "hypothetical" because under the majority view, as he saw
it, no other states could tax such transactions for exactly the same reasons which prevented Washington from doing so. It followed that,
since local business was taxable and interstate business was everywhere
exempt, the former not the latter suffers the burden of discrimination.
But for Black these are essentially legislative problems:
Only a comprehensive survey and investigation of the entire
national economy--which Congress alone has power and facilities
to make---can indicate the need for, as well as justify, restricting
the taxing power of a State so as to provide against conjectural
taxation by more than one State on identical income. A broad
and deliberate legislative investigation-which no Court can
make-may indicate to Congress that a wise policy for the national economy demands that each State in which an interstate
business operates be permitted to apply a non-discriminatory tax
to the gross receipts of that business either because of its size and
volume or partially to offset the tendency toward centralization
23. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255-256, 258 (1938).
23a. 305 U. S. 434 (1939).
24. Id. at 439.
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of the nation's business. Congress may find that to shelter interstate commerce in a. tax exempt refuge-in the manner of the
judgment here-is to grant that commerce a privileged status,
over intrastate business, contrary to the national welfare."
As though in answer to Black's observation that it was really
local business which was being discriminated against (because of immunities afforded interstate commerce), the majority in the "revolutionary" McGoldrick v. Beawind-White 26 decision permitted the state
at the buyer's end of an interstate sale to impose a sales, or gross receipts, tax. Mr. Justice Stone, for the Court, observed that:
Non-discriminatory taxation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is not prohibited . . . it was not the purpose

of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just share of state tax burdens, merely because
an incidental or consequential effect of the tax is an increase
in the cost of doing business . . . (The present tax) is con-

ditioned upon events occurring within the state, either transfer of
title or possession of the purchased property, or an agreement
within the state, "consummated" there, for the transfer of title
or possession.26 a
Hughes, McReynolds and Roberts objected that this was taxation
of interstate commerce of a kind long since outlawed.
Black (with Douglas and Murphy) had no trouble in going along
with the majority for the language was sufficiently broad to justify
similar taxation in the seller's state as well, which Black had been
urging all along as justifiable in the absence of discrimination or Congressional action. It fell to Mr. Justice Frankfurter after Stone's
death to dispell any illusions which Black, Douglas, and Murphy might
have had on that score. In Freeman v. Hewit2 1 speaking for a majority, he struck down another gross income tax in the seller's state.
Stone's line was held, but the departed Chief Justice's "cumulative
burden" language was dismissed as merely a "fashion" in judicial
utterance. The new fashion, which sounds quite old to some, is to
speak in terms of the "directness" of the tax upon interstate commerce
-a fashion which Frankfurter there indulges at least ten times to
explain his result.
The return to the "directness" doctrine is condemned as a return to
formalism. But it is difficult not to see the same "formalism" in Stone's
efforts. As Professor Powell has observed the "revolutionary" Berwind
25. Id. at 449.
26. 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
26a. Id. at 43-47.
27. 329 U. S. 249 (1946), Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting.
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White case added not a whit to state taxing power.2 7 a It nierely per-

mitted the buyer's state "to impose a sales tax without calling it a use
tax." But in Stone's hands the "cumulative burden" rule prohibited
only the more general sales, or gross receipts, taxes imposed by the
seller's state upon interstate transactions. It did not interfere with
slightly more specialized taxes called something else, for example,
"privilege taxes" upon an interstate publishing business measured by
receipts from the sale of advertising. 2 To save himself from the logic
of his own cumulative burden language Stone fell back upon the
"direct" burden approach.
So far as the advertising rates reflect a value attributable to
the maintenance of a circulation of the magazine interstate, we
think the burden on the interstate business is too remote and too
attenuated to call for a rigidly logical application of the doctrine
that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not be made the
measure of a tax.

.

.

.

Here it is perhaps enough that the

privilege taxed is of a type which has been regarded as so separate
and distinct from interstate transportation as to admit of different
treatment for purposes of taxation.

.

.

.

The dangers which

may ensue from the imposition of a tax measured by gross receipts
derived directly from interstate commerce are absent.2
Similarly it was only the tour de force prohibiting a sales tax in
the seller's state which removed the cumulative burden objection to a
sales tax in the buyer's state-a purely arbitrary choice (so far as the
Constitution is concerned) as between the two possibilities. Yet Stone
justified the buyer's state sales tax without admitting the tour de force,
by pretending, as in the advertising case, that the taxable event was a
local occurrence "separated" from the total interstate transaction. Indeed Stone's language and method in the Berwind-White (buyer's
state) case would apply equally in the seller's state cases-it is merely
a matter of "separating" a local incident of an interstate activity and
ignoring its organic economic relation to the whole transaction.
As we have already seen, for Stone and Frankfurter a basic function of the Supreme Court is to act as "arbiter" (Stone) or "mediator" (Frankfurter) in the federalism area where national and state
interests conflict and Congress is silent. For present purposes this
means balancing on an ad hoc basis the claim that interstate com27a. Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 HARV. L. RTv. 909 (1940).
28. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938). Note also
how the majority including Stone uses "directness" language in J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.
v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 312 (1938) to distinguish American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U. S. 459 (1919) which like the Western Livestock case certainly opened the
door to cumulative tax burdens.
29. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 259-260 (1938Y.
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merce should pay its own way against the claim for protection of the
national market from Balkanization. Stone's historical contribution
was to counteract the emphasis which the Court had been giving the
Balkanization claim-but he did not deny that claim's importance.
Historical context explains Stone's linguistic emphasis upon freedom
for state taxation, but he remained an arbit&r, a balancer, of two
mutually hostile claims. When the facts of a particular case threw
the arbitral scales one way he resorted to "local incident," or "directness" language or even to a tour de force to permit state taxation.
When the scales indicated a threat of Balkanization he resisted state
taxation on cumulative burden grounds. As Stone, himself, put it:
Experience has taught that the opposing demands that the
commerce shall bear its share of local taxation, and that it shall
not on the other hand, be subjected to multiple tax burdens merely
because it is interstate commerce, are not capable of reconciliation by syllogism. Practical rather than logical distinctions must
be sought.30
Frankfurter as mediator balances the same demands on the same
ad hoc, "practical," basis, but prefers to do so under the single mantle
of the directness language-the cumulative burden approach deceptively suggesting both precision and ventures into the economics of tax
incidence not contemplated even by its author.
Frankfurter, who since Stone's death seems to be the center
around which a majority coagulates in federalism tax cases, found his
foil in Mr. Justice Rutledge. In a lengthy separate opinion in the
Hewit case Rutledge stated his own position and condemned both
Stone's and Frankfurter's approaches, though he agreed with their
results. Rutledge brings out into the open Stone's tour de force (confining sales taxation to the buyer's state) ; acknowledges it as constitutionally arbitrary though economically justifiable, but condemns
Stone's Berwind-White "local incidence" rationalization for it.3 For
Rutledge the real criteria-the proper language-was neither "directness," nor "local incidence," but "the risk of multiple state taxation." 32
Since all three Justices agree in the fiat that sales taxes may be imposed only in the buyer's state, the dispute is purely one of terminology
30. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 259 (1938). The
foregoing analysis resolves, for example the inconsistency which Magill, Stone on Taxation, 46 CoL. L. REv. 747, 755 (1946), finds in Stone's positions in the Western Livestock case, supra, and Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650 (1936).
31. Id. at 270-271, 278, 280-281. Rutledge would refine the tour de force by permitting the seller's state to impose a sales tax provided it allows a credit for any sales tax
due or paid in the buyer's state. Id. at 279.
32. Id. at 272.
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in sales tax cases. Not so in cases involving other types of state taxation! Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone," the latest case on the
subject, illustrates the practical difference between the Rutledge and
Stone-Frankfurter positions. There appellant operated a pipe line entirely within Mississippi for the transportation of oil from the oil
fields to railroad tank cars as the first leg in a certain and immediate
trip from the Mississippi oil fields to refineries in other states. Mississippi sought to impose "annual privilege taxes" upon appellant's "gross
income."
For Rutledge (with Black, Douglas and Murphy) the tax was
permissible since it
does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of
competing intrastate commerce of like character. The nature of
the subject of taxation makes apportionment unnecessary; there
is no attempt to tax activity carried on 3outside
Mississippi's
4
borders. No other state can repeat the tax.
Mr. Justice Burton in a separate opinion, finding that appellant's
activities did not constitute interstate commerce, concurred in Rutledge's result, but expressly repudiated his reasoning. Accordingly the
tax was upheld over the dissents of Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson and
the Chief Justice who objected on "directness" grounds.
The process which begins with the extraction of crude oil from
the ground in Mississippi, moves on through a refinery in Louisiana
and terminates in the consumption of gasoline, etc., let us say, in Tennessee, is an organic economic process. For Rutledge, though he condemns "multiple state taxation" of interstate commerce, any state along
the way may tax that process without apportionment provided it selects
an incident, however indispensable to the completion of the whole
process, which occurs entirely within the taxing state. Mississippi may
tax the transportation within Mississippi; " Louisiana may tax the
equivalent of stevedoring when the oil is unloaded at the Baton Rouge
refinery; 3' Tennessee may tax the sale to the consumer at Knoxvilfe 3'
-to mention only propositions to which Rutledge expressly assented.
It follows that the "directness" rule gives greater protection against
multiple state taxation of interstate commerce than the "multiple tax"
33. 69 S. Ct. 1264 (1949). See also case cited in note 36, infra.
34. Id. at 1267.
35. Ibid. Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson and Vinson dissenting.
36. Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947)
the dissents of Rutledge, Douglas, Murphy and Black, invalidated on
grounds a gross receipts tax on a stevedoring company engaged wholly
York in loading vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce.
37. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940),
which Rutledge approves, Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 273 (1946).

which, over
"directness"
within New
the result of
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rule. 8 No wonder that Black, Douglas and Murphy, who as in the
regulatory cases have given up the fight for "leave it to Congress,"
found a refuge with Rutledge. Except in the sales tax cases the
"multiple tax" rule in effect "leaves it to Congress."
One final problem. What is the status of Hewit in view of DuMond? The "directness" rule of the former obviously entails judicial
weighing of conflicting state and national interests on an ad hoc, case
to case basis. Does DuMond, coming after Hewit, foreshadow its
demise in favor of a "mechanistic formula"-Rutledge's perhaps-for
tax cases comparable to that apparently established by DuMond for
regulation cases? Presumably not, for in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Stone which came after DuMond the Justices were divided four
to four between the "multiple taxation" and "directness" rule. Burton
threw the decision Rutledge's way, not because he agrees with the
"multiple tax" rule, but because in that particular case he did not find
interstate commerce involved. Since Burton has joined in the Hewit
position on earlier occasions '9 where he conceived interstate commerce
to be involved, one concludes that DuMond does not alter the majority
status of Hewit. If the conceptionalism of Commerce Power versus
Police Power is to rule in regulation cases, ad hoc mediation (under
the cloak of the "directness" formula) still dominates in the settlement
of state tax claims upon national commerce.
38. Cf. Independent Warehouse, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70 (1947).
39. In addition to the Hewit case itself, see, for example, Joseph v. Carter &
Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947).

